something boundless and in excess of our cognitive capacities. If it is hard to say why the expression chosen by the painter, which to be sure is undoubtedly empathetic, is so fitting, and why the feeling it produces is not quite resolvable into the pleasurable form of the 'beautiful', or the reassuring consensus that founds a community of taste, we can perhaps at least say that the comportment of the man whose face it is escapes any fixed location within the space of the mundane. Subjecting the spectator to an infinite gaze, he both sees us, and looks beyond us. In fact, to the extent that it holds us captive to this gaze, one might say that in Messina's portrait of Christ, here we find a face that resolutely refuses to blink. Thus the image of the son of god does not refer its viewer back to man, or to the world stage, or to an existence bound by the mortal or morbid corruptions of the flesh -the 'ills to which the body is heir'. It refers man to what surpasses bounded existence: the infinite and unseen countenance of God and the ineffable 'mysterium' of an absolute, omnipotent and transcendent authority. And yet, is it not the case that the power of Messina's portrait of Christ in fact rests upon a paradox? It lies in the way we are referred to that which exceeds all human capacities of signification, and to an absolute that no image could contain. Nonetheless, at the same time, one is confronted with the imperfect face of a man. It is here that the icon hovers miraculously over the abyss of representational form, conjuring all the powers of art to defy the effects of gravity. The binding of God to the materiality of the flesh and to the finite particularity of the body cannot but assail Messina's attempt to represent Christ as a mere man, invoking the paradox of how an absolute and universal being could come to be expressed in a form with which it is incommensurable and with which it shares no common measure. Messina's icon, then, whose empathetic effect derives from its remarkable realism, and from the attempt to depict Christ as a 'psychological' being, will unknowingly insinuate into the doctrine of the incarnation the impossibility that already lies at the heart of representation and which was implicitly understood in the Judaic prohibition against the idolatrous act of presenting the countenance that even Moses was not allowed to see. This is why the problem of the incarnation cannot evade the problem of representation, and why the latter at least, which claims to stand in a relation of transparency to the thing 'represented' will in time capitulate to the contradiction inherent in the opaque matter of representation -an opacity that renders representation and its rationality ultimately inscrutable.
If this paradox, which assails the image of Christian transcendence, in Messina's portrait of Christ, nevertheless provides a means for opening up the possibility of the experience of the abject/sublime -it is precisely because it touches upon the essential ambiguity inherent within representational form into which the face of Christ threatens to collapse. Hovering between legibility and illegibility; transcendence and immanence; recognition and misidentification, it is the face that disturbs us precisely because it reveals something inaccessible. The cause of this disturbance and turmoil is not just attributable to the fact that, as Levinas says at one point, 'in the image, thought reaches the face of the other reduced to its plastic forms' (Levinas 1999: 123) but also, and more disturbingly, it is because it reveals that the face is, above all else, an image, a resemblance of itself, embodied in a plasticity that confronts thought with a density it cannot fully penetrate, comprehend or grasp. Greater, therefore, than those yawning precipices, where solitary travellers measure themselves up to the abyss, or those rising pyramids, so beloved of orientalist painters, that seem to hold sway over the infinite magnitude of the desert, or the ravaged seascape, in Gericault, which imperils the lives of a few shipwrecked survivors, clinging piteously to a raft that is already breaking apart, or the 'vast scale', as Kant puts it, of nature's might (Kant 1952: 115) , here, on Castellucci's 6 been incited to abandon sensibility ' (1952: 92) . The feeling of the sublime is not produced by nature at all but by the work of the imagination which, as Kant says, 'by its own act' deprives itself of its own freedom. In the sublime, the subject's freedom appears in the negative form of subjection to an object for which it is essentially responsible. But in the moment of sublime affect: 'the ground of this [freedom] is concealed from [the subject], and in its place it feels the sacrifice or deprivation, as well as its cause, to which it is subjected ' (1952: 120) . This is why, to truly understand the sublime phenomenon, we must displace the subject's fixation with the object to reveal the very ground of freedom in which sublime feeling originates. Here it is a matter of 'setting before our eyes the sublimity of our nature (in its vocation) while at the same time showing us the lack of accord of our conduct with respect to it' (Kant 2001: 74) . Only by realising its true vocation, which is one of freedom, does the word 'subjection' take on, for the subject, an authentically sublime quality. In so doing, it immediately displaces the series of affects that are usually associated with the phenomenon of the sublime: horror, fear, terror, melancholy, etc., -in fact, what we might call Kant's radical sublime, is discovered at the cost of downgrading such sublime affects to mere theatrical effects.
There is only one feeling that Kant is willing to credit with genuine sublimity: that of 'respect' or 'reverence'. This is because only respect can claim to have a ground not based on empirical stimuli, as Kant expresses it, in his Groundwork of the Metaphysic of
Morals:
reverence… should function as an inflexible precept for the will; and it is just this freedom from dependence on interested motives which constitutes the sublimity of the maxim and the worthiness of every rational subject to be a law-making member of the kingdom of ends (Kant 1995: 100). The form of subjection, then, which commands respect is subjection of the subject to its own law; that is, subjection to the only law through which the subject can, at one and the same time, learn the true dignity of obedience and (without succumbing to logical absurdity) assert its freedom.
Nevertheless, we should take note of the discrepancy marked by Kant, above, between the sublimity of our vocation for freedom and our actual distance from freedom's reality, our lack of accord with it. For the subject to be able to achieve its freedom, it must transcend the pathological domain of sensuous interests: it must oppose itself to all worldly desire. The subject thus finds itself inscribed within a dimension that is purely negative. Just as in the sublime, which, as Kant says, 'can never be more than a negative presentation' (Kant 1952: 127) , so the problem for the subject, in Kantian Further observation: to look at Antonello da Messina's painting is to understand the subtle and yet decisive transformation that Castellucci's use of the image brings about, in so far as it exposes its iconography to the power of the abject.
In blowing it up, it is precisely the face that Castellucci cuts out of the painting -not by removing it, however, but on the contrary, through the act of isolating it from its symbolic framework. This cut immediately destabilises the face -and precisely by removing the theatrical gesture, which grounds its meaning: the hands of Christ, the one that rests on the table, subtly directing us to the little prop -the cartellino, the piece of parchment bearing an inscription, indicating the theatrics of the trompe l'oeil form of representation; and the other, the hand that forms the benedictory sign, which indicates its function as a devotional image. The effect is to press the face to the point at which its phenomenality indeed seems to hover on the brink of a collapse; and where the image itself seems to give way to the violence of abstraction. Deprived of the apparatus of the symbolic order of representation -its expression no longer possesses the power of signification; the face seems to suggest the dispersal of its elements … and becomes anonymised… are we not led to ask: who's face is this?
This anonymity, which is of the essence of the face, should, I think, trouble us. If as Levinas says, the face contains within it, the biblical injunction 'Thou Shalt not Kill' but must 'Love thy Neighbour' -is it not also the case that the face, and not just the unrecognisable face of the stranger, but precisely the faces of our neighbours with whom we are most familiar, have the power to inspire us to violent, even murderous passionsthose of hatred and fear? 1 This will be the kind of criticism levelled at Levinas by Zizek, who accuses Levinas of an 'ethical prettification' of the other that fails to take account of the radical 'Otherness of a human being reduced to inhumanity' (Zizek 2009: 165) . What Levinas overlooks is the fact that 'the Neighbour is the (evil) Thing which potentially lurks beneath every homely human face ' (2009: 16) ; Sartre, likewise, albeit in a different context and milieu, in which it is scarcity, rather than alterity per se, that constitutes the radical negation of man, would argue, nevertheless, that the other is 'an anti-human member of an alien species' and the 'principle of Evil' (Sartre 2004: 149) . Still, what is evil if it is not precisely the horrifying appearance before the subject of something it considers abject? Evil and alterity converge in the face where all apparent meaning has collapsed; nevertheless, as with Kant's radical sublime, one should not confuse the source of evil with the evil attributed to the hated object. Let us give that source a name:
if it is not exactly one's own body, with its excretions, plasticity, functional failings, and so on, it is something proximate to it; it is the 'thing'/ das Ding that one is. Is it not the case, then, that the subject, in an effort to evade the traumatic convulsion caused by encountering its own impersonal and uncanny 'thingly' presence, withdraws from its alienation by attributing an evil and monstrous density to a human other, even though, as we have said, the abjection is the subject's own? What this shows is that Levinasian ethical transcendence and the radical evil associated with states of abjection, which is to say, the failure to achieve such transcendence, remain two sides of the same human 'face'. Both faces -the face that holds me hostage and the face from which I withdraw in abject disgust -derive, also, from the same crisis; both must be seen to be symptomatic of the same predicament that arises with the permanent revocation of the ethical today -in Zizek's terms, from a kind of unending 'politico-religious suspension of the ethical' (Zizek 2009: 478) or what Agamben refers to as the permanent state of exception -in which what we confront is a world deprived of the guarantees afforded by the former safe havens (or consolations) of religion or transcendental philosophy.
Final observation: how it ends.
As the father slowly makes his departure from the stage, his absence is gradually replaced by an increasingly excruciating noise: a deafening, inhuman, soundscapewhat appears to be the white noise of grating metal. It is as if the theatre machine itself were suddenly exposed in its infernal purpose -and, as if to confirm this: the image of Christ's face, peering at us from out of the gloom of what little light remains, appears to begin weeping. Instead of tears, however, it is a putrid black effluence that seems to seep through the pours of the painting -slowly at first, but eventually forming a torrent, until nothing remains of the image -or the face, which is literally effaced…what one is left with is the 'faceless' anonymity of the stage. What one might call, the Il y a… the bare fact of the 'there is' of the theatre (Levinas refers to the 'Il y a' as 'existing without existents', it is a 'being without nothingness, which leaves no hole and permits no escape' Levinas 1987: 50).
If there is more at stake here than mere iconoclasm, it is because the destruction of the image on the stage brings us before the abject condition in which theatre's own materiality is announced. Or rather, produced: and it is into this field of production, which is usually concealed from the audience, that the viewer is drawn, revealing a space of discrepancy, opened up between what the theatrical image promises, on the one hand -that which is meant to produce, through the machinery of the theatre, a complete meaning, that is to say, deliverance of the audience from the turbulence and disarray provoked by the disturbing 'event' of the theatre through to the relaxation induced by a catharsis -and, on the other hand, what those images fail to symbolise: the safe passage to a conciliated world, which is meant to demonstrate the spectator's autonomy as much as the character's salvation. This discrepancy, in Castellucci's work, would appear, thereby, to rent open the very frame of theatrical representation revealing its inherent instability. It produces a hiatus in the symbolic function of the image, or of theatre's capacity to produce an image capable of transcending its theatrical origin in order to attain that hallowed and sacred place where art and religion were once conjoined; and it points to the crisis -one is tempted to say, once again following Lyotard, the 'disaster' of theatre in so far as it makes this failure to complete the circuit of representation its object.
What we are left with is the curious satisfaction that comes with displeasure:
Castellucci's is a theatre that refuses to console its audience with the theatricality of false icons, that is to say, with mere theatrical transcendence. As such, it is a theatre that seems to relish in exploiting the tension that opens up the edge that runs between the abject and the sublime: the latter, the sublime, grounds the theatre in the failure of representation; the former, however, which returns us to the abjection of theatre's questionable materiality, suggests that the theatre is also not so sublime: it is grounded in the failure of the achievement of transcendence.
